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Factors Inducing Ex Parte Divorces
Anthony 1. Fiorette
Ohio divorce laws are characterized by inconsistent judicial and legis-
lative public policies which in many instances have outgrown their practi-
cal necessity. Setting forth the statutes and rules controlling the trial judge
in divorce actions, the author argues that a mechanical application of the
judge-adopted rules of "clean hands," recrimination, and collusion has
encouraged ex parte proceedings which may prohibit the court from ar-
riving at the truth. Mr. Fiorette considers the practical effect of these
defenses to be a degradation of marriage and suggests that modern public
policy should not discourage divorce when marital relations are such that
the legitimate objects of matrimony have been destroyed. A reevaluation
of the public policy and the statutes concerning divorce is necessitated by
the numerous factors, including contractual separation by mutual agree-
ment, which induce ex parte divorces with their attendant undesired
results.
HE LAW OF domestic relations in Ohio is a patchwork of
public policies, some established by the legislature and others
declared by the judiciary. The courts have announced that the pub-
lic policy of this state is to foster, protect, and preserve the marital
status.' Working at cross pur-
poses is the legislature, which
THE AUTHOR (B.S., Ohio State Univer- by statute has established a
sity, LL.B. and M.L., John Marshall Law public policy of permitting the
School) is a practicing attorney in Cleve- dissolution of the marriage
land, Ohio, and a member of the Ohio
Bar and the Inter-American Bar Associa- whenever there has been com-
tion. pliance with applicable divorce
statutes.
2
The courts have asserted,
without benefit of an express statutory basis, that public policy re-
quires denial of a divorce to an applicant who is guilty of miscon-
duct constituting a ground for divorce and denial to both spouses
where each has been guilty of such marital misconduct.' The courts
maintain that it is the public policy of this state to deny a divorce
where the parties have entered into a collusive agreement to with-
1 E.g., Maimone v. Maimone, 90 N.E.2d 383, 386 (Ohio Ct. App. 1949); Phillips
v. Phillips, 48 Ohio App. 322, 324, 193 N.E. 657, 658 (1933); Pashko v. Pashko, 101
N.E.2d 804, 806 (Ohio C.P. 1951).
2 OHIO REV. CODE §§ 3105.01-.99.
8 E.g., Sevi v. Sevi, 168 N.E.2d 440, 441 (Ohio Ct. App. 1959); Nelson v. Nelson,
108 Ohio App. 365, 369, 154 N.E.2d 653, 657 (1958); Sandrene v. Sandrene, 121
N.E.2d 325, 326 (Ohio Ct. App. 1952); Keath v. Keath, 79 Ohio App. 517, 520, 71
N.B.2d 520, 522 (1946).
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hold evidence from the court such as would prevent the granting
of a divorce under the "dean hands" doctrine.4
The courts similarly hold it to be the public policy of Ohio to
preserve the unity of family life, to encourage the spouses to live
together, and to prevent separation.5 But a considerable time be-
fore the legislature passed a statute in 1887 allowing spouses to
separate by mutual agreement and to make a complete property
settlement,8 the courts had established that it was not contrary to
public policy for the spouses to enter into "articles of separation,"
provided they did in fact separate. Such agreements, if fair and
just, would then be enforced in equity. Where the spouses are sep-
arated, with or without an agreement, legislative enactment set
forth the public policy to permit an action for "alimony only."7
The theory of "alimony only" actions has been judicially extended
to authorize the trial court to make a division of property in the
same manner as in the granting of a divorce!
In addition, the courts have devised a fixed policy of mechan-
ically applying the canonical doctrines of collusion, dean hands,
and recrimination in every divorce case where there is an agreed
arrangement not to defend or where the applicant is in court with
unclean hands. This doctrine is applied regardless of other factual
evidence in the case which should be considered by the court to en-
able it to administer justice according to the requirements of that
case. 
9
While it may be urged that these public policies, to the extent
that they are inconsistent, merely reflect the division of belief in
modern society as to the sanctity of marriage, it is well to consider
the causes inherent in this setting from which a vexing social prob-
lem has emerged.
By 1832, the trend towards the uncontested divorce case or the
cex parte proceeding" had become a definite source of annoyance
to the trial court,10 and over the years the trend has even accelerated.
4 E.g., Van DeRyt v. Van DeRyt, 6 Ohio St. 2d 31, 35, 215 N.E.2d 698, 703 (1966);
Maimone v. Maimone, 90 N.X.2d 383, 386 (Ohio Ct. App. 1949); Campbell v. Camp-
bell, 75 N.E.2d 698, 699 (Ohio Ct. App. 1947).
5 See Pashko v. Pashko, 101 N.E.2d 804 (Ohio C.P. 1951).
8 84 Ohio Laws 132, 133.
7 Omo REv. CODE § 3105.17; see Durham v. Durham, 104 Ohio St. 7, 11, 135
N.. 280, 281 (1922).
8 See Griste v. Griste, 171 Ohio St. 160, 163, 167 N.E.2d 924, 926 (1960); Brewer
v. Brewer, 117 Ohio App. 263,268, 192 N.E.2d 106, 107 (1962).
9 See Hatter v. Hatter, 5 Ohio 319 (1832).
10 See cases cited note 22, 32 & 64 infra.
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On January 1, 1967, there were 5865 cases pending in Cuyahoga
County on the divorce docket. From experience, it may be stated
that of these cases, the vast majority which reach final decree will
be disposed of as "uncontested matters."
The uncontested divorce case requires little adjudication be-
cause minimal evidence is presented for the trial court's considera-
tion. The trial judge thus decrees according to the will of the appli-
cant and is precluded from adjudicating rights and administering
justice on the basis of the whole truth of the marital controversy.
Matters of property rights, alimony, support, custody, and visitation
privileges are not to be decreed lightly. After the broken home
and disrupted family life, these are the means with which to com-
mence rebuilding a new life for the parties and their minor children.
Inadequate disposition of these vital matters usually results in eco-
nomic injury, juvenile delinquency, and other social problems, with
added burdens on the community. This is the price for the guaran-
teed divorce, even without collusive involvement.
I. CHANGING PUBLIC ATTITUDE TOWARD
DISSOLUBILITY OF MARRIAGE
The notion entertained by some that marriage is not indissoluble
and that it may be terminated developed quite early into a "public
policy" which became firmly embedded in the social and legislative
history of this state." When Ohio was part of the Northwest Ter-
ritory, a law relating to divorce was pronounced in 1795 by the
territorial governor and judges at Cincinnati; in 1804 the Ohio
Legislature passed its first enactment on divorce.' From the begin-
ning of its history, the State of Ohio has permitted as a matter of
public policy the procurement of divorce either by act of the legis-
lature or by statute.' In 1848, the supreme court ended the prac-
tice of "legislative divorces" by holding that divorces are the subject
of judicial, not legislative, action and that the Ohio Constitution
expressly prohibits the granting of divorce by the General Assem-
bly.'
4
Throughout the United States and in Ohio, divorce is solely a
statutory action, as the legislature may impose conditions or abolish
11 See generally OHIO REV. CODE § 3105.01-.99.
12 3 Ohio Laws 177.
13 DeWitt v. DeWitt, 67 Ohio St. 340, 348, 66 N.E. 136, 139 (1902).
14 Bingham v. Miller, 17 Ohio 445 (1848); OHIo CONST. art. II, § 32.
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the grounds entirely.'5 The state allows divorces not as a punish-
ment to the offending party or as a favor to the innocent party, but
rather because it believes its own prosperity will thereby be pro-
moted, although the public policy relating to marriage is to foster
and protect the relationship, to make it a permanent and public
institution, to encourage the parties to live together, and to prevent
separation."0 It has been judicially noted that the public policy
fostering, protecting, and preserving the marriage status continues
to influence the trial judge until the applicant's right to a divorce
is established in accordance with applicable laws; at that point the
public policy relating to divorce takes over.'
Traffic on the "divorce road" has been and continues to be on
the increase. It has been stated generally that "the number of di-
vorces granted has increased tremendously in proportion to the pop-
ulation. The number of uncontested divorce cases and the ease
with which divorce is procured are.., well known .... ,"1s Simi-
larly, "the sanctity of divorce has not made divorce less popular nor
has it discouraged the perpetration of fraud in procurement of di-
vorce. '9  The trend is further demonstrated by decisions asserting
that "divorces are at a scandalously high level in the United States
today '20 and that "the widespread attitude of disregard for the mar-
riage contract is still a grave cause for concern,"'21 as it has been in
regard to ex parte hearings since 1832.22
This rapid rise in the number of divorces granted, particularly
in ex parte proceedings, indicates that the number of people in the
United States who do not seriously regard the status of marriage as
binding "until death do us part" has been and is constantly increas-
ing.
I-. LEGISLATIVE DIREcTrrs FOR HEARING AND
GRANTING DIVORCES
Matters pertaining to residence, service, and other procedural
requirements set forth in the divorce statutes are not a part of this
15 See State ex tel. Haun v. Hoffman, 145 Ohio St. 31, 60 N.E.2d 657 (1945);
State v. Sherwood, 13 Ohio App. 403 (1921).
16 Pashko v. Pashko, 101 N.E.2d 804 (Ohio C.P. 1951).
17 See Phillips v. Phillips, 48 Ohio App. 322,193 N.E. 657 (1933).
18 Jelm v. Jelm, 155 Ohio St. 226,239,98 N.E.2d 401,408 (1951).
19 Ibid.
20 Pashko v. Pashko, 101 N.E2d 804, 809 (Ohio C.P. 1951).
21 Van DeRyt v. Van DeRyt, 6 Ohio St. 2d 31, 35, 215 N.E.2d 698, 703 (1966).
22 See Harter v. Harter, 5 Ohio 319 (1832).
19673 1191
WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
discussion which is intended primarily to deal with the statutes and
rules controlling the trial judge in the hearing of the divorce action
after it proceeds to trial on the merits. The statutes pertinent
thereto are sections 3105.11 and 3105.10 of the Ohio Revised
Code. In the pertinent part of the former section, the legislature
directs the trial judge as follows:
A judgment for divorce or for alimony shall not be granted upon
the testimony or admissions of a party unsupported by other evi-
dence. No admission shall be received which the court of com-
mon pleas has reason to believe was obtained by fraud, connivance,
coercion, or other improper means .... 23
The statute contains no express language making collusion,
clean hands, or recrimination a defense which the court must
recognize and apply, nor does it set up any defense whatever. How-
ever, to reiterate, the trial court is directed to receive no "admission"
which it has reason to believe was obtained by improper means.24
It has been judicially asserted that if a dilution of the divorce laws is
desired, the forum for change should be the General Assembly and
not the courts;25 likewise, if the divorce laws are to be "hardened,"
that should also be done by the legislature and not by the courts.
Nor does it seem proper to invoke equitable power and jurisdiction
for the application of the defenses of collusion, clean hands, and
recrimination in light of case law indications that "there must be a
statutory basis upon which to exercise those powers before they may
be put into play."26
Connivance is not to be confused with collusion. Whereas "a
connivance in divorce law is a married party's corrupt consenting to
evil conduct of the other whereof afterwards he complains,"2 col-
lusion includes any agreement between the parties to present no
defense to the action for the dissolution of the marriage tie which,
if defended, would not be dissolved under the clean hands rule.2"
Beginning with the first divorce statute enacted in 1804,29 the only
statutory guideline provided for the exercise of judicial discretion in
granting divorces has been "proof to the satisfaction of the court.""0
2 3 OHIO REv. CODE § 3105.11.
24 Ibid.
25 Van DeRyt v. Van DeRyt, 6 Ohio St. 2d 31, 35, 215 N.E.2d 698, 703 (1966).
26 Haynie v. Haynie, 169 Ohio St. 467, 469, 159 N.E.2d 765, 766 (1959).
27 Backenstoe v. Backenstoe, 14 Ohio Dec. 353, 355 (C.P. 1904).
28 See Maimone v. Maimone, 90 N.E.2d 383, 386 (Ohio Ct. App. 1949).
29 3 Ohio Laws 177.
30 Oio REv. CODE § 3105.10.
1192 [Vol. 18: 1188
EX PARTE DIVORCES
The pertinent part of the present state statute on the subject directs:
"The court of common pleas shall hear any of the causes for divorce
or annulment charged in the petition and may, upon proof to the
satisfaction of the court, pronounce the marriage contract dissolved
and both of the parties released from their obligations ....
A reasonable construction of the statute refers to the "satisfac-
tion" of the particular judge hearing the case. Upon proof to his
satisfaction of any of the causes for the action, he may grant the
divorce. Conceivably, what may satisfy one judge may not be suf-
fident to another. A judge's ideology, philosophy, and lessons
from life's experiences necessarily play some part in his view of the
particular case, and recognizing this basic fact, the legislature pru-
dently has provided a built-in power for the exercise of discretion
as measured only by the court's satisfaction. But, in practice, the
courts have deemed themselves further obligated, as evidenced by a
long history of case law, to require an applicant to come into court
with dean hands, to be free of conduct constituting a ground for
divorce, and to be free of collusive conduct before a divorce may be
granted. Judicial restraint is based upon the assumption that in
every case, regardless of the circumstances, the public interest will
thereby be served. This is not the broad discretion conferred by
statute or expected in the exercise of judicial functions. It is rather
the mechanical application of the judge-adopted rules of collusion,
clean hands, and recrimination, without benefit of the express
statutory basis, which has given impetus to ex parte proceedings
which in turn have the effect of prohibiting the court from ar-
riving, in the majority of cases, at the real truth of the matter3
It would seem reasonable to assume, after more than a hundred
years, that the courts have some awareness of the fact that litigants
who feel that they must have a divorce will pursue their advantages
in an ex parte proceeding under the existing system.
IM. MECHANICAL APPLICATION OF DEFENSES
INDUCES Ex PARrE HEARINGS
Numerous articles have appeared in various legal periodicals
during the past thirty years on the subject of the canonical defenses
of collusion, clean hands, and recrimination. The authors have
traced the circumstances of the origin and application of these de-
fenses, their acceptance by the ecclesiastical courts of England, and
81 Ibid.
32 Harter v. Harter, 5 Ohio 319 (1832).
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their adoption by the American courts in the early part of the nine-
teenth century. More pertinent to this discussion are the strong
reasons advocated in the various articles for repudiating the rules
which make any of such defenses an absolute bar to the granting
of divorces."
A. Development of Ohio Law
The recorded Ohio story on the subject appears to begin with
Mattox v. Mattox, 4 where a plaintiff-wife, suing for divorce on the
ground of adultery, was herself found to be living in adultery and
to have given birth to an illegitimate child. The court stated that
the divorce statute could not be construed as offering a bounty to
the guilty but was intended for the relief of injured innocents, that
the case had to be decided by principles which prevailed in courts
of equity, and that since the plaintiff-wife had not come into court
with clean hands, her petition must be dismissed. 5 Further, the
court made clear that the ground on which the divorce was denied
was not new in the practice of that court. Thus, the spouses were
left where the court found them - in a state of adultery. From
that point on, the Ohio courts in trial of divorce and alimony ac-
tions have followed the principles announced in the Matox case,
although not without finding it necessary to justify the application
of the clean hands and recrimination doctrines on a basis other than
on equitable powers and jurisdiction."
In 1902, the supreme court in DeWitt v. DeWitt"7 determined
that the divorce court cannot exercise general equity powers and
jurisdiction and that in trial of divorce and alimony matters, the
trial judge was to be controlled by statute and could not nullify the
positive requirements of the statute.3 Notwithstanding this change
33 Bradway, Collusion and the Public Interest in the Law of Divorce, 47 CORNELL
L.Q. 374 (1962); Bradway, The Myth of the Innocent Spouse, 11 TuL. L REV. 377
(1937); Chafee, Coming Into Equity With Clean Hands, 47 MICH. L. REV. 1065
(1949); Moore, A Critique of the Recrimination Doctrine, 68 DICK. L. REv. 157
(1963-1964); Raskin & Katz, The Dying Doctrine of Recrimination in the United
States of America, 35 CAN. B. REV. 1046 (1957); Comment, Modification of the An-
cient Doctrine of Recrimination, 4 ARIZ. L. REV. 89 (1962); Comment, Divorce Re-
form in Texas - The Path of Reason, 18 Sw. L.J. 86 (1964).
84 2 Ohio 233 (1826).
85 Ibid.
3 6 DeWitt v. DeWitt, 67 Ohio St. 340, 350, 66 N.E. 136, 139 (1902).
37 67 Ohio St. 340, 66 N.E. 136 (1902).
38 Id. at 351, 66 N.E. at 139.
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of view, the supreme court found that the Mattox case was correctly
decided3 9
By 1933, the courts were holding that not only must there be
an injured party but also the injured party must be free from fault
amounting to a legal ground for divorce before the court would be
warranted in granting a decree of divorce.4 The belief of a trial
court that it would be better for the parties to have a decree of di-
vorce is not to be a controlling consideration.41
In 1945, a court of appeals, following the principle established
in DeWitt, reiterated that the divorce statutes do not expressly con-
fer any jurisdiction to enforce the equitable rule as to dean hands
or the similar canonical doctrine of recrimination.42 It maintained
that enforcement of the doctrine by the courts of this state was based
on the concept that he who seeks redress for the violation of a con-
tract resting on mutual dependent covenants "must himself have
performed the obligation on his part, rather than on the equitable
maxim of 'dean hands."',,
In 1953, after section 3105.20 was amended to contain the
language that "in any matter concerning domestic relations, the
court shall not be deemed to be deprived of its full equity powers
and jurisdiction," a court of appeals declared that the dean hands
and recrimination doctrines by reason of said amendment may now
be applied as an exercise of equitable power and jurisdiction.44 But,
the supreme court later held that there must be a statutory basis
before they may be put into play.45
Thus, with or without equitable powers and jurisdiction, the
Ohio courts have found means to employ these canonical doctrines
in divorce and alimony matters and to disclaim any discretion in
their application. Repeatedly, the doctrine of comparative recti-
tude has been repudiate. 46
39 Id. at 348, 66 N.E at 138.
4o E.g., Phillips v. Phillips, 43 Ohio App. 322, 193 N.E. 657 (1933).
41 Id. at 323, 193 N.E. at 657.
4 2 OpperMan v. Opperman, 77 Ohio App. 69, 74, 65 N.E2d 655, 658 (1945).
43 Id. at 74-75, 65 N.E.2d at 658.
44 Nelson v. Nelson, 108 Ohio App. 365, 369, 154 NYE.2d 653, 657 (1958); Lewis
v. Lewis, 103 Ohio App. 129, 132, 144 N.E.2d 887, 889 (1956).
4 5 Haynie v. Haynie, 169 Ohio St. 467, 469, 159 N.E2d 765, 766 (1959).
4 6 Sevi v. Sevi, 168 N.E.2d 440, 442 (Ohio Ct. App. 1959); Sandrene v. Sandrene,
121 N.E2d 324 (Ohio Ct. App. 1952); Keath v. Keath, 78 Ohio App. 517, 520, 71
N.E.2d 520, 522 (1946).
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B. Practical Effect of Recrimination and Unclean
Hands Defenses
Where both spouses are found to be guilty of misconduct con-
stituting grounds for divorce, neither would be entitled to a di-
vorce.47 Also, in an uncontested divorce action where the evidence
discloses the plaintiff to be guilty of misconduct constituting a
cause for divorce, the court may invoke the clean hands doctrine
and leave the parties, as they were found,48 in the undefined and
dangerous category of a "husband without a wife" and a "wife with-
out a husband."4
9
Though often averred, it is questionable whether it has ever
been shown precisely how the public interest is served in those in-
stances where reconciliation has been proven to be utterly impos-
sible, where the parties are firmly settled in living apart, and where
the marriage status which public policy seeks to protect is reduced
to a mere sham and family life is nonexistent. Public policy ought
not discourage divorce where the relationship between husband and
wife is such that the legitimate objects of matrimony have been
utterly destroyed. Marriage is degraded and frustrated when the
courts use it as a device for punishment."
The traditional function of courts is to administer justice in
each case in accordance with the circumstances of that case, yet the
task is not accomplished by the court's "washing its hands" of the
case solely because the applicant for divorce is in court with un-
clean hands. Conceivably, there are situations in which public
interest may require that the litigants be given an opportunity to
wash their unclean hands instead of being relegated to a life of sin
and error.
One court did find that it should not apply the clean hands
doctrine and thereby deny a divorce to the litigants where each had
a prior spouse living at the time of their marriage ceremony.5"
However, the statute expressly specifies that "having a prior spouse
living" is a ground for divorce, and a denial of divorce in such a case
would appear to be an abuse of discretion. 2 Other courts have
mentioned that a trial judge is vested with unlimited discretion in
47 Ibid.
48 Nelson v. Nelson, 108 Ohio App. 365, 369, 154 N.E.2d 653, 657 (1958).
4 9 Head v. Head, 2 Ga. 191,206 (1847).
50 De Burgh v. De Burgh, 39 Cal. 2d 858, 864, 250 P.2d 598, 601 (1952).
51 Smith v. Smith, 72 Ohio App. 203, 214-15, 50 N.E.2d 889, 894 (1943).
52 Eggleston v. Eggleston, 156 Ohio St. 422, 428, 103 N.E.2d 395, 398 (1961).
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applying the dean hands doctrine,53 but whenever the applicant
was found guilty of misconduct constituting a ground for divorce,
the dean hands doctrine was applied and the divorce denied.5"
C. Adoption of the Collusive Test
From a social point of view, it is hard to defend a rule that re-
crimination is an absolute bar to the granting of a divorce.55 To
implement the enforcement of the dean hands and recrimination
doctrines, the rule of collusion was also adopted and applied by
the courts without the benefit of an express statutory basis.5" The
evil of collusion lies in the making of any agreement to conceal or
withhold evidence from the court of such misconduct on the part
of the applicant which, under the dean hands doctrine, would
preclude the granting of a divorce.57 Courts are required to be
vigilant against collusion, fraud, or imposition when the husband or
wife seeks to dissolve the marriage bond. The court in the divorce
hearing represents the state, and any agreement to withhold or con-
ceal such pertinent evidence would tend to defeat the state's interest
in the preservation of that marriage and is therefore repugnant to
the law.5" Neither the court nor counsel may aid or encourage any
collusion in the procurement of a divorce, and a collusive agree-
ment openly arrived at is no less repugnant to the settled policy of
the law than is a secret agreement.5" Recently, the Ohio Supreme
Court reiterated that "'because of the interest of the public in the
preservation of the marital status, divorce suits are accorded differ-
ent treatment from ordinary civil actions and it becomes the duty of
a court in such cases to be vigilant against collusion and to see that
there is compliance with the applicable statutes.' "60 To constitute
collusion there must be some agreement between the parties for
concealing and withholding evidence. One party, acting alone,
5 8 Slyh v. Slyh, 135 N.E.2d 675, 676-77 (Ohio Ct. App. 1955); Flatter v. Flatter,
130 N.E.2d 145, 147 (Ohio Ct. App. 1954).
5 4 Underwood v. Underwood, 89 N.E.2d 167 (Ohio Ct. App. 1949).
5 5 Vanderhuff v. Vanderhuff, 144 F.2d 509 (D.C. Cir. 1944); De Burgh v. De
Burgh, 39 Cal. 2c 858, 250 P.2d 598 (1952).
5 6 Maimone v. Maimone, 90 N.E.2d 383 (Ohio Ct. App. 1949).
57 Id. at 386.
58 Ibid.
59 Id. at 387.
60 Van DeRyt v. Van DeRyt, 6 Ohio St. 2d 31, 35, 215 N.E.2d 698, 703 (1966),
quoting with emphasis from State ex rel. Haun v. Hoffman, 145 Ohio St. 31, 32, 60
NB.2d 657, 658 (1945).
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cannot make such action collusive.61 Worthy of mention here is
the rule under present English law that "collusion is no longer an
absolute bar to relief."'
D. Reevaluation of Public Policy
After asserting that a court cannot ignore the growing aware-
ness that a marriage in name only is not a marriage in any actual
sense, a California court appropriately stated:
It bears noting how frequently divorces are uncontested. In
many cases neither spouse is "innocent," and yet, by agreement,
one of them defaults to ensure a divorce. Thus a strict recrimi-
nation rule fails in its purpose of denying relief to the guilty.
Moreover, it exerts a corrupting influence on the negotiations that
precede the entry of such a default. The spouse who more des-
perately seeks an end to a hopeless union is penalized by the abil-
ity of the other spouse to prevent a divorce through the assertion
of a recriminatory defense, and the more unscrupulous partner may
obtain substantial financial concessions as the price of remaining
silent. Were the clean hands doctrine properly applied, it would
encourage estranged couples to bring their differences before the
chancellor, where the interests of society as a whole can be given
proper recognition and where settlement negotiations can be su-
pervised and unfair advantage prevented. 63
It may bear further observation of how the advantages of ex parte
proceedings become evident to litigants who desire to avoid scandal
and to protect the dignity of the family and its members. In spite
of repeated complaints by the supreme court since 1832 that "per-
haps there is no statute in Ohio more abused than the statute con-
cerning 'divorce and alimony,' and perhaps there is no statute under
which greater imposition is practiced upon the court and more in-
justice done to individuals,"64 there has been no relaxation of its
rules requiring the mechanical application of the defenses of collu-
sion, dean hands, and recrimination which have served to induce
ex parte proceedings.
In presenting its analysis of this problem, the Court of Appeals
for Cuyahoga County asserted the following:
It has been suggested that the law against collusive decrees is
more honored in its breach than its observance. We are told in
61 Campbell v. Campbell, 75 N.E.2d 698, 699 (Ohio C.P. 1947).
62 Nash v. Nash, 2 WEEKLYL. REP. 317, 320 (1965).63 De Burgh v. De Burgh, 39 Cal. 2 d 858, 869, 250 P.2d 598, 604 (1952).
64 Harter v. Harter, 5 Ohio 318-19 (1832); accord, Van DeRyt v. Van DeRyt, 6
Ohio St. 2d 31, 34, 215 N.E.2d 698, 703 (1966); Jelm v. Jelm, 155 Ohio St. 226, 231,
98 N.E.2d 401, 404 (1951).
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argument that the enormous number of divorce cases on the docket
of the Common Pleas Court and the multitude of complex social
problems arising therefrom make necessary the adoption of short
cut measures to insure the efficient and prompt disposition of
pending cases. We answer these arguments by asserting that it is
our duty to declare and apply the law as we find it. Also, it is the
duty of this court and of courts of original jurisdiction to uphold
the public policy of the state as declared in the authoritative pro-
nouncements of the supreme court. Any action of a trial court
calculated to subvert that policy is an abuse of discretion. 65
On the other hand, the supreme court has correctly asserted that
"what was in the interest of public policy or conducive to public
welfare 100 years ago may not be so today."66  Courts ought not
perpetuate error. When a rule is out of harmony with the condi-
tions of modern society, the reason for the rule no longer obtains,
and what is judge invented should be judge destroyed. 7
IV. SEPARATION BY MUTUAL AGREEMENT INDUCES
Ex PARTE PROCEEDINGS
It is the public policy of this state that the parties may not, by
their own choice or whim, dissolve the "contract" which made them
man and wife. 8 Neither may the contract be abrogated because
of "mere inconvenience, unhappiness or incompatibility of tempera-
ment or disposition, or the desire for pre-marriage freedom, or be-
cause the marital comforts and pleasures of life are not provided as
abundantly as was anticipated and expected. ' 69  The public policy
of Ohio also demands strict compliance with divorce statutes which
are "'designed to prevent the sundering of the marriage ties for
slight or trivial causes.' The marriage status may be dissolved
only by death or by divorce in accordance with applicable statutes.7'
In addition it has been declared to be the public policy of this state
to prevent separation of the spouses, to encourage their living to-
gether, and to preserve the unity of family life.72
Paradoxically, it has long been the settled public policy to en-
force in equity articles of separation entered into by the spouses
65 Maimone v. Maimone, 90 N.E.2d 383, 387 (Ohio Cc. App. 1949).
66 Jelm v. Jelm, 155 Ohio St. 226, 230,98 N.E.2d 401,404 (1951).
6 7 Montgomery v. Stephan, 359 Mich. 33, 49, 101 N.W.2d 227, 235 (1960).
68 Siebert v. Siebert, 32 Ohio App. 487,168 N.E. 223 (1929).
69 Id. at 491, 168 N.E. at 224.
70 Kennedy v. Kennedy, 111 Ohio App. 432, 434, 165 N.E.2d 454, 456 (1959).
71 Dibble v. Dibble, 88 Ohio App. 490, 510, 100 N.E.2d 451, 461 (1950).
72 Pashko v. Pashko, 101 N.E.2d 804, 806 (Ohio C.P. 1951).
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without inquiring into the cause therefor and without need of any
judicial approval. 3
A. Statutory Separation by Contract
The canon law did not allow parties bound in marriage to sepa-
rate and withdraw from cohabitation without the sentence of a legal
tribunal to that effect, and the court, in making suitable provision
for the wife and children, could enforce its orders by spiritual cen-
sure74 - something which our law cannot do. In Ohio, a spouse
excluded without cause from the marital dwelling may, if he or she
so desires, enlist the aid of the law to gain readmission. 5 But where
the spouses are separated by agreement or otherwise, there is gen-
erally no legal procedure to compel return to. cohabitation.7
It has been suggested that the Ohio General Assembly eventually
supported the principle "that while divorce ought not to be the sub-
ject of mutual agreement, and accomplished at will, yet there ought
to be some provision that something less than a divorce, for instance
an immediate separation, might well be the subject of mutual agree-
ment."77  In any event, that, among other things, is precisely what
the General Assembly accomplished in enacting the Husband and
Wife Act of March 19, 1887.78 In granting the "wife" the power
to contract as if unmarried (femme sole), the right she previously
had in equity to agree to an immediate separation was not curtailed.
Under the act7" the spouses may enter into any engagement or trans-
action with each other that conforms with the rules controlling
the actions of those in a confidential relationship.
Upon this right of spouses to contract with each other, a fur-
ther limitation was imposed. Under the act8" a husband and wife
are not permitted to alter their "legal relations," that is, alter the
rights and obligations of husband and wife, including the right of
dower and the distributive share in the estate of the other, unless
73 Garver v. Miller, 16 Ohio St. 528, 532 (1866); Thomas v. Brown, 10 Ohio St.
247, 250 (1859); Bettle v. Wilson, 14 Ohio 257, 269 (1846).
74 Hope v. Hope, 1 Sw. & Tr. 94, 95-97, 164 Eng. Rep. 644, 645 (Div. & Mat.
1858).
75 Hickle v. HFckle, 6 Ohio C.C.R. 490, 509 (1892).
76 E.g., Proctor v. Proctor, 2 Hag. Con. 292, 302, 161 Eng. Rep. 747, 751 (1819).
77 DuBois v. Coen, 100 Ohio St. 17, 30, 125 N.E. 121, 125 (1919) (dissenting
opinion).
78 84 Ohio Laws 132.
79 Presently Osno REv. CODE § 3103.05.
80 OHnO REv. CODE § 3103.06.
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they agree to an immediate separation and actually do live apart
from each other."'
(1) Authorization of Partial Divorce.-Thus, what may be
regarded as a "partial divorce" became authorized by statute. A
mutual agreement for separation may be entered into at any time,
and no reason or cause is required by law. Moreover, upon sepa-
rating, the spouses have been allowed under the statute to make
provision for the support of either and for their minor children
during the separation and to effectuate a complete property settle-
ment.8" Of course, such agreements must meet the requirements
of rules controlling the actions of persons who occupy a confiden-
tial relationship.
83
In conclusion, there seems to be no presumption that such an
agreement for the settlement of property rights made in contempla-
tion of a possible divorce is necessarily collusive, although the di-
vorce court will look to all the circumstances of the case to deter-
mine whether the contract has that effect.84
(2) Judicial Enforcement of Separation Agreements.-Where
a court in its divorce decree adopts the language of such a separa-
tion agreement and incorporates the agreement into the decree, it
becomes an order of the court and is enforceable as such. 5 A de-
cree based on an agreement of the parties is not subject to modifi-
cation after expiration of the court term in which the original decree
was rendered, absent a reservation of jurisdiction with reference
thereto, unless mistake, misrepresentation, or fraud is present.8 '
But the trial court in a divorce case is under no compulsion to
approve a separation agreement previously entered into by the
parties." The court is not restricted by any former agreement exist-
ing between the parties, which at least must be fair and equitable.
Guidelines for evaluating such agreements are furnished solely by
the present financial status of the spouses, their probable income,
and their present means of support.88 Further, it is the duty of the
8 1 Hoagland v. Hoagland, 113 Ohio St. 228, 232, 148 N.E. 585, 587 (1925).
82 Tullis v. Tullis, 138 Ohio St. 187, 194, 34 N.E.2d 212, 216 (1941).
8 3 Hoagland v. Hoagland, 113 Ohio St. 228, 148 N.E. 585 (1925), interpreting
OHIO REv. CODE § 3103.06.
84 Dreitzler v. Dreitzler, 115 Ohio App. 231, 233, 184 N.E.2d 679, 681 (1961);
Riggle v. Riggle, 148 NXE.2d 72, 76 (Ohio Ct. App. 1957); Purmont v. Purmont, 32
Ohio N.P. (ns.) 313, 319 (C.P. 1933).
8 5 Holloway v. Holloway, 130 Ohio St. 214, 217, 198 N.E. 579, 580 (1935).
86 Newman v. Newman, 161 Ohio St. 247, 118 N.E.2d 649 (1954).
87 See 18 OHIO JTR. 2D Divorce and Separation § 184 (1956).
8 8 Stark v. Stark, 8 Ohio L Abs. 287, 289 (C.P. 1929).
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trial court to determine whether such agreements are fair and just
before permitting their incorporation into the decree of divorce.89
B. Separation by Other Than Mutual Agreement
When spouses separate by other than mutual agreement, similar
results ensue. The conjugal relations are severed. The unity of
family life is destroyed. Children and spouses alike lose the whole-
some atmosphere of domestic happiness, and the marriage status
exists in name only. The legislative and judicial thinking have
demonstrated an awareness of these consequences. Prior to the
1953 amendment to section 3105.20,"0 the trial judge in actions for
"alimony only" was not authorized to make a division of prop-
erty- 1  The court in such actions was limited to granting relief for
alimony, custody, child support, and visitation privileges. It was
reasoned that in such actions, the marriage contract was not dis-
solved and a future reconciliation would restore the wife to her for-
mer status and rights. A division of property was not proper so
long as the marriage status subsisted.92
With the amendment providing that in any matter concerning
domestic relations the court shall not be deemed to be deprived of
its full equity powers and jurisdiction, the public policy in actions
for "alimony only" has been extended to permit the court to make
similar property settlements as in the granting of a divorce.98
After the spouses have separated and have altered their "legal
relations" with a complete property settlement, an ex parte divorce
decree becomes a necessity in most cases.
V. OTHER FACTORS INDUCING Ex PARTE
PROCEEDINGS
The separation and property settlement, whether agreed to by
the parties or set forth in a decree in an "alimony only" action,
does not, of course, solve all of the problems which result from the
8 9 Hassaurek v. Markbreit, 68 Ohio St. 554, 580, 67 N.E. 1066, 1068 (1903); Mai-
mone v. Maimone, 90 N.E.2d 383, 387 (Ohio Ct. App. 1949); accord, Dreitzler v.
Dreitzler, 115 Ohio App. 231, 233, 184 N.E.2d 679, 680 (1961).
90 Omo REv. CODE § 3105.20.
91 See 51 Ohio Laws 377 (1853); Durham v. Durham, 104 Ohio St. 7, 11, 135 N.E.
180, 181 (1922).
92 Ibid.
93 Griste v. Griste, 171 Ohio St. 160, 163, 167 N.E.2d 924, 926 (1960); Brewer
v. Brewer, 117 Ohio App. 263, 268, 192 N.E.2d 106, 107 (1962), appeal dismissed,
174 Ohio St. 317, 189 N.E.2d 79 (1963).
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marital disruption. If the relations between husband and wife are
such that family life has become oppressive and intolerable, re-
course to the divorce court by either may be anticipated despite the
obstacles of possible recriminatory defenses. Sooner or later the
desire for freedom may lead either spouse to the divorce court.
There appear to be reasons other than the desire to be free to
remarry that may compel either or both spouses to seek a final dis-
solution of the marriage by a divorce decree.
A. Change in Financial Status
A property settlement which was fair, just, and equitable at the
time it was made by the parties may not be acceptable to a divorce
court several years later because of material changes in the financial
status of the parties. In a divorce action the trial judge, when al-
lowing alimony, is guided exclusively by the Ohio Revised Code:
"The court of common pleas may allow alimony as it deems reason-
able to either party, having due regard to property which came to
either by their marriage, the earning capacity of either and the value
of real and personal estate of either, at the time of the decree."94
The court may, under appropriate circumstances, refuse to approve
the agreement previously entered into by the parties and may make
its own award at the time of the decree as to what it deems fair. "
Permanency and stability of the property settlement finally agreed
upon by the parties are greatly desired by each spouse, and approval
of the agreement by the divorce court removes uncertainty as to this
problem. 9
6
B. Federal Tax Consequences
A federal tax problem furnishes another incentive to seek a
final decree of divorce where transfers of property are involved in a
property settlement between the spouses. The Internal Revenue
Code provides for certain property settlements:
Where husband and wife enter into a written agreement relative
to their marital and property rights and divorce occurs within 2
years thereafter (whether or not such agreement is approved by
94 OmO Rav. CODE § 3105.18.
95 Ziegler v. Ziegler, 166 Ohio St. 406, 407, 143 N.E.2d 589, 590 (1957); Roberts
v. Roberts, 113 Ohio App. 33, 36-37, 177 N.B.2d 281, 284 (1961); Brewer v. Brewer,
84 Ohio App. 35, 37, 78 N.E.2d 919, 920 (1948); Leibrock v. Leibrock, 107 N.E.2d
418, 424-25 (Ohio C.P. 1952); Stark v. Stark, 8 Ohio L. Abs. 287, 289 (C.P. 1929).
96 See Newman v. Newman, 161 Ohio St. 247, 118 NB.2d 649 (1954).
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the divorce decree), any transfers of property or interests in prop-
erty made pursuant to such agreement -
(1) to either spouse in settlement of his or her marital or prop-
erty rights, or
(2) to provide a reasonable allowance for the support of issue
of the marriage during minority,
shall be deemed to be transfers made for full and adequate con-
sideration in money or money's worth.97
The federal tax regulations prescribe certain filing requirements,
and it appears: (a) that a gift is not made until the property is actu-
ally transferred; (b) that the divorce must be granted within two
years from the date the agreement is executed; (c) that a return
should be filed in the year the agreement is executed even though
there has been no transfer of property; and (d) that a certified copy
of the final decree of divorce should be furnished to the District
Director not later than sixty days after the divorce is granted.9"
Transfer of property made between spouses in conformance with
the statute and the regulation pertaining thereto seemingly will not
be taxable as "gifts."
VI. CONCLUSION
Reform in the laws of Ohio relating to divorce, "alimony
only," separation and to the enforcement of support for the wife,
child support, custody, and visitation privileges is long overdue.
But it should be a studied reform. The bench and bar are most
qualified and have a duty to provide the necessary leadership and
impetus for such an undertaking. In the interim, some of the evils re-
suiting from ex parte proceedings can be remedied by applying the
doctrines of collusion, clean hands, and recrimination not me-
chanically but in the broad discretion of the court under its "full
powers of equity" as the justice of the particular case may require.
97 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2516.
9 8 Treas. Reg. § 25.6019-3(b) (1958).
1204
